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INTRODUCTION

Among the most controversial issues in modern professional sports is
the threat that the owners of a professional sports franchise will move the
franchise because they consider the present stadium unacceptable. One
avenue of competition and a status symbol for a major metropolis is a pro-
fessional sports team, and civic leaders do not want the franchise to move.
Yet, to obtain a franchised team, cities have to find the means to lure teams
away from their roots. The most popular and effective incentive is the
publicly funded stadium. However, civic leaders may not wish to subsidize
a new stadium with publicly raised funds. It is difficult for civic-minded
leaders to justify spending public tax dollars to build expensive new sta-
diums that owners are demanding.
Public financing is always a challenge because the decision-makers
must answer three primary questions. Will the stadium be worth the cost?
How will construction costs be funded? Is it an appropriate use of public
funds?1 Because the answers are never easily discernible, decision-makers
face a major dilemma: either give in to franchise owners, who are seeking
to capitalize on financial opportunities presented by the new stadiums, or
refuse to cooperate with the owners by refusing demands made by owners
to subsidize a new stadium. Either way, it is a lose-lose situation for the
taxpayer.
Robert Baade, Professor of Economics at Lake Forest College,
suggests owners, in concert with league commissioners, claim ³old sta-
diums´ are economically obsolete;; such stadiums simply do not generate
sufficient revenue to compete for the free-agent talent necessary to compete

1. See Frank A. Mayer, III, Stadium Financing: Where We Are, How We Got Here, and
Where We Are Going, 12 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 195, 196 (2005) (citing MARTIN J.
GREENBERG, THE STADIUM GAME 187 (2d ed. 2000));; see also Ian Dobson, The Wrong
Gameplan: Why the Minnesota Vikings Failure to Understand MiQQHVRWD¶V Value Dooms Their
Proposal For a New Stadium and How the Team Can Improve Its Future Chances, 33 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 485, 489-90 (2006).
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on the field.2 Perhaps this is an honest conclusion, but questions still
remain. Will a new stadium improve a baseball club¶s financial position
within Major League Baseball, and who should foot the bill and pay for the
new stadium? Do state legislators have the right to spend millions of tax-
payer dollars to subsidize millionaires? Does the court system have the
right to enact eminent domain to acquire needed land? Or should the
owners of the teams pay for the stadiums themselves?
A preponderance of academic research has disputed building a new
stadium will lead to economic development in the form of increased
incomes, jobs, and revenue. Most economic studies have found the local
economy receives, at best, only limited economic benefits from the con-
struction of modern stadiums. Economist Robert Tillis,3 former head of the
Sports Advising Group for JP Morgan, concluded a privately financed
stadium is feasible, but only in cities such as New York and Los Angeles.
Thus, the ultimate question remains: is this public subsidizing trend just
another corporate bailout?
Many people perceive professional sports teams as beneficial to the
local economy and essential to an area¶s civic identity;; sports permeate
multiple aspects of our lives. It is this popularity that sports franchises use
to their advantage. The presence of a professional sports franchise from
one of the four major sports²football, baseball, basketball, and hockey²is
often regarded as a prerequisite to becoming a ³big league´ city or state.
People become so attached to a team that it becomes part of the identity of a
city or state.4 Marlin Schneider, a Wisconsin State Representative, joked in

2. Robert A. Baade, Some Observations on a New Fenway Park: Is It Necessary? Is It
Financially Prudent?, in CTR. FOR STUDY OF RESPONSIVE LAW 2 (June 13, 2001). Baade com-
pleted a financial study of the feasibility of a new stadium for the Boston Red Sox in 2000 by
analyzing four state of the art ballparks built during the period of 1990 to 1996. Id. He concluded
KLV VWXG\ E\ VWDWLQJ ³*LYHQ WKH FRVW RI WKH SURMHFW LW LV XQOLNHO\ WKDW WKH QHZ VWDGLXP ZLOO HQKDQFH
Red Sox revenues to a point that allows them to be more financially competitive than they are
now, especially since the benefits the Red Sox expect from the new stadium are of typically mar-
JLQDO VLJQLILFDQFH´ DQG WKH\ DUH DOUHDG\ ILQDQFLDOO\ FRPSHWLWLYH ZLWK WKH UHVW RI WKH 0DMRU /HDJXH
Baseball. Rather than hiring new players with the increased revenue, the Red Sox would be re-
tiring debt. Id.
3. Robert J. Tillis is the founder and Chief Executive Officer of Inner Circle Sports. Prior to
his CEO position, he served as Managing Director of JP Morgan Sports Advisory and Finance
Group where he had been active in many high profile assignments in stadium financing.
4. See Don Nottingham, Keeping the Home Team at Home: Antitrust and Trademark Law as
Weapons in the Fight Against Professional Sports Franchise Relocation, 75 U. COLO. L. REV.
1065 (2004);; see also Poe v. Hillsbourough Cnty., 695 So.2d 672, 678- )OD  ³7KH &RXUW
finds that the [Tampa Bay] Buccaneers instill civic pride and camaraderie into the community and
that Buccaneer games and other stadium events also serve a commendable public purpose by en-
hancing the community image on a nationwide basis and providing recreation, entertainment and
cultural activitLHV WR LWV FLWL]HQV´  -EFFREY D. JAMES, BECOMING A SPORTS FAN:
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1995, ³Without the Milwaukee Brewers, the Milwaukee Bucks, and Green
Bay Packers, [Wisconsin] ain¶t nothing but another Nebraska.´5
Going to a sporting event is no longer just about watching the game²
It is about the ³stadium experience.´ The great American sporting pastime
isn¶t just a game²it is a very successful multi-billion dollar business.6
Because of the preponderance of evidence against the economic de-
velopment justification, recent stadium requests by franchises have focused
on anywhere from quality of life arguments to justify public expenditure.
The attitude expressed by some franchise owners might be an exclusive ex-
perience for those with discerning taste who seek the very best life has to
offer.
Funding and acquisition costs raise a myriad of economical, political,
and legal issues. However, two of the primary issues are eminent domain
and the use of public financing to acquire the land. These two issues will
be the focus of this paper. Though tax incentives appear to be the major
financing tool used by civic leaders to attract franchise owners, this article
will primarily address the eminent domain issues. Stadium deals negotiated
by elected officials have led to public outrage, lawsuits, and legislative pro-
posals. Often the benefits provided to the owners end up as financial losses
to the communities.
II. TRENDS IN SPORT STADIUM CONSTRUCTION
AND RETROFITTING
Since Baltimore began the trend in 1992, stadiums have either been
built new or retrofitted, routinely increasing the square footage up to fifty
percent over earlier ballparks.7 New stadiums have been erected at an
astonishing pace.8 One reason for the boom in stadium construction is the
UNDERSTANDING COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIALIZATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
FAN LOYALTY (1997);; Robert Taylor Bowling, Sports AgJUDYDWHG 7KH )DQ¶V *XLGH WR WKH
Franchise Relocation Problem in Professional Sports, 28 STETSON L. REV. 645, 649 (1999) (dis-
FXVVLQJ WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI EHLQJ D ³ELJ OHDJXH´ FLW\ ZLWK D SURIHVVLRQDO IUDQFKLVH 
5. Sports Law²Come Back, Shane: The Movement of Professional Sports Teams,
LAW.JRANK.ORG (Mar. 16, 2011, 8:17 PM), http://law.jrank.org/pages/10434/Sports-Law-
COME-BACK-SHANE-MOVEMENT-PROFESSIONAL-SPORTS-TEAMS html.
6. Eric R. McDonough, Escaping Anti-Trust Immunity²Decertification of the National
Basketball Players Association, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 821, 821 n.3 (1997).
7. See Brett Smith, If You Build It, Will They Come? The Relationship Between Public
)LQDQFLQJ RI 6SRUWV )DFLOLWLHV DQG 4XDOLW\ RI /LIH LQ $PHULFD¶V &LWLHV, 7 GEO. PUB. POL¶Y INST.
45, 45 (2001) (stating public financing did not become the norm until the 1950s, when stadium
construction began to increase dramatically).
8. Peter Whorsky, Sports Stadium Deals Cost U.S. Treasury Big Bucks, THE UNION LEADER
(Manchester, N.H.), July 30, 2003, at B3 (explaining at least thirty-eight major league sports
venues have been built or rebuilt using nearly seven billion dollars in tax-exempt financing).
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movement away from multi-purpose facilities.9 Franchise owners want
their own single-purpose facility, and if the present locale¶s leaders falter
when the subject of a new stadium subsidized by taxpayer money is raised,
then the owners threaten to move the franchise to a more willing buyer.10 It
appears that it is a seller¶s market when it comes to acquiring a sports fran-
chise in a new locale as long as the league does not allow new teams to
enter the market.
A. TRENDS FROM 1950-1990
Prior to 1950, team owners were usually financing and building new
stadiums themselves, such that ³they had a very direct interest in keeping
costs down while still sitting the facility in a location accessible to their
core market.´11 The first stadium to be totally publicly financed was the
Los Angeles Coliseum in 1923.12 However, the United States had a vested
interest in this stadium. The idea was to have a stadium large enough for
the U.S. Olympic Committee to vote to hold the Olympic games in Los
Angeles.13 Unfortunately, the United States did not win its Olympic bid,
but Los Angeles was left with a great stadium, which is still in use today.14
Fenway Park and Chicago¶s Wrigley Field, two of the most famous and
publicized sports venues which were privately funded are also still used
today for the purposes for which they were built.15
Government subsidies prior to 1950 did not raise much criticism
because public funding of sports stadiums was not yet common practice.16
Public financing began during the 1950s, with a change in the relationship
between sports and government.17 From 1953 to 1979, thirty stadiums were

9. See ROGER G. NOLL & ANDREW ZIMBALIST, SPORTS, JOBS, AND TAXES: THE ECONOMIC
IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS 30-48 (1997).
10. Mary Jo Malone, Setting Sail Against the Tide of Fans and the NFL, ST. PETERSBERG
TIMES -DQ   DW E GLVFXVVLQJ WKH %XFFDQHHUV RZQHU¶V WKUHDWV WR OHDYH WKH FLW\ ZLWK the
team if Tampa Bay did not provide money to build a new stadium);; see also Thomas A. Piraino, A
Proposal for the Antitrust Regulation of Professional Sports, 79 B.U. L. REV. 889, 912-13 (1999).
11. Tim Chapin, The Political Economy of Sports Facility Location: An End-of-the-Century
Review and Assessment, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 361, 369-70 (2000).
12. Raymond J. Keating, Sports Pork: The Costly Relationship Between Major League
Sports and Government, 339 POL¶Y ANALYSIS 1, 4 (1999).
13. Id.
14. Andrew M. Zaretsky, Should Cities Pay For Sports Facilities?, THE REGIONAL
ECONOMIST, Apr. 2001, at 5, 6.
15. Id. (stating Fenway Park, Ebbets Field, Wrigley Field, Yankee Stadium, and the original
Comisky Park were all privately owned and financed).
16. Andrew H. Goodman, Policy and Practice, 9 SPORTS L.J.173, 180 (2002).
17. Smith, supra note 7, at 46.
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built.18 Before 1953, there were only twenty-eight professional stadiums
constructed in the United States.19 Of the thirty stadiums constructed in the
United States between 1953 and 1979, twenty-seven received financial
support.20 The taxpayer support totaled over $450 million, nearly seventy
percent of the total cost of all thirty stadiums during the 1950 to 1970
period.21
In most instances, the public funding amounts to seventy percent of the
cost of building a new stadium. During the 1960s, a total of $513.69
million was devoted to new sports facilities, of which 63.2% was public
money. In the 1970s, a total of $1.7 billion was devoted to new sports
facilities;; 94.6% was public money. In the 1980s, the figure for new sta-
diums grew to $1.5 billion, which included 78.6% public money, and in the
1990s, the figure for building new stadiums had grown to $8 billion, which
included 73.4% public money.22 In the 1970s and early 1980s, cities like
Seattle, Baltimore, and Detroit were persuaded to build large stadiums
because the cities¶ leaders thought that would lure major sports teams to
their areas and would serve as an economic stimulus.23
Raymond J. Keating, chief economist for the Washington-based Small
Business Survival Committee, stated during the twentieth century, $20
billion was spent in building major league stadiums, ballparks, and arenas.24
That figure includes $14.7 billion in government subsidies but excludes the
billions of dollars in subsidies provided through the use of tax-free
municipal bonds.25 In 1999, Keating predicted, based upon the various re-
quests from teams and cities for subsidized monies, another $9 billion will
be spent at the taxpayers¶ expense.26 He concluded the economic facts do
not support the position that sports teams should receive taxpayers¶

18. Keating, supra note 12, at 12-13.
19. Id. at 11-12.
20. Id. at 12-13. Only the Colt stadium in Baltimore, the Great Western Forum, and Madison
Square Garden did not receive any public monies. Id.
21. Id. at 10-11. Interestingly, the tax advantages that owners receive, including municipal
subsidies for the construction of stadiums, occur without the franchises being required to provide
full financial information demonstrating the need for the money.
22. John Siegfried & Andrew Zimbalist, The Economics of Sports Facilities and Their
Communities, 14 J. ECON. PERS. 95, 96 (2000).
23. Id. at 95 (noting from 1900 to 1999, forty-six major league stadiums and arenas were
built or retrofitted for the four major sports of football, baseball, basketball, and hockey, and ty-
pically these new and retrofitted stadiums were in cities that depended upon eminent domain for
the funding).
24. Keating, supra note 12, at 1.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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subsidies.27 The lone beneficiaries of sports subsidies are team owners and
players. Results of studies on the changes in the economy resulting from
the presence of stadiums, arenas, and sports teams show an absence of
positive economic impact from professional sports, but there may be a pos-
sible negative effect.28
B. TRENDS FOLLOWING 1990 TO PRESENT
After 1990, big stadiums with increased seating capacity were no
longer the choice of team owners. The µ90s were truly a time of change. It
is a challenging period to analyze because four ballparks were built during
that period that many believe set the standard for revenue-generating fa-
cilities.29 They were all considered to be ³state of the economic art.´30 The
stadiums were Camden Yards in Baltimore, Maryland;; Jacobs Field in
Cleveland, Ohio;; the Ballpark in Arlington, Texas;; and Coors Field, in
Denver, Colorado.31
In 2006, two economists, Marc Poitras and Lawrence Hadley, ex-
amined thirteen stadiums built between 1989 and 2001 and concluded that
these facilities, if they would have been funded by private dollars, would
probably have recovered all or nearly all of the construction costs of the
stadiums within twelve years.32 Poitras and Hadley calculated if a $268
million stadium expected to produce $33 million a year²by taking into
consideration team performance, ticket prices, the ³honeymoon period´ of a
new stadium, stadium capacity, and player salaries²half of the cost would
have been recovered within the first five years, and all costs would have
been recovered by the end of twelve years.33 Andrew Zimbalist, an
economics professor at Smith College in Massachusetts, agreed the above
study was carefully designed, but he questioned if the owners would agree
to wait twelve years to recover their privately spent funds.34 The owners
would have argued that having to expend their own money would have
placed them in a disadvantaged position, especially when they looked at the

27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Baade, supra note 2.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 8.
32. See generally Marc Poitra & Lawrence Hadley, Do New Major League Ballparks Pay
For Themselves?, 79 J. BUS. 2275 (2006).
33. See generally id. at 2296-99.
34. NOLL & ZIMBALIST, supra note 9, at 28-29 (describing the non-viability of stadiums
when assessed on the basis of the incremental profit expected over the life of the facility).
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³free agent market´ of players.35 If owners were left to rely on their own
funds, they would likely choose functional no-frill stadiums that would pro-
duce the predicted results in the study by Poitra and Hadley. But, the teams
would have had to risk the possibility that declining rates of return might
occur as the stadium aged. This, Zimbalist stated, would place the teams at
a competitive disadvantage in the current financial market.36
Therefore, city leaders, who desired the privilege and prestige of
having the image of ³a major league city,´ attempted to entice existing
teams to move to their city by offering them luxury stadiums with the
amenities demanded by the owners. As professional sports expanded,
politicians and business leaders pushed for taxpayer financed stadiums to
lure teams away from their home stadiums.37 Other cities, such as
Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Cincinnati, built stadiums for teams already in
their towns but justified the expense as a way to keep the teams from
moving.38 Politicians argued the stadiums would generate enough revenue
to cover the construction costs.39 Often, these enticements were the ul-
timate results of bargaining points demanded by the owners who appeared
to be seeking a new facility. It became a bidding war between two cities
each wanting the professional team. As a result, many owners and teams
have received ³sweetheart deals´40 from city and state leaders so the fran-
35. Id.
36. Id. at 17.
37. See Ken Belson, As Stadiums Vanish, Their Debt Lives On, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2010,
http://nytimes.com/2010/09/08/sports/08stadium.html (discussing the examples of: Shea Stadium,
built for the New York Mets expansion team;; Fulton County Stadium, built in Atlanta to lure the
Braves from Milwaukee;; and a stadium built by Oakland to entice the Athletics to move from
Kansas City, Missouri).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. ³6ZHHWKHDUW GHDOV´ LQFOXGH ILQDQFLDO IXQGLQJ GHVLUHG E\ WKH RZQHUV IRU GLUHFW EXLOGLQJ
expenditures;; help in the preparation of environmental impact studies that must be completed and
filed;; cooperation by political leaders for zoning variances that must be obtained;; legal assistance
for acquiring land by the use of eminent domain for the building of the stadium, approach roads,
and parking lots;; adjusting and building public transportation routes which must be changed by
the city leaders;; and the benefit of below-market rents. See Dennis Coates & Brad R. Humphries,
The Stadium Gambit and Local Economic Development, 23 REG. MAG., no. 2, 2000 at 15-20. The
authors examined thirty-seven cities where franchises existed for sports teams and found that
sports franchises frequently used their monopoly power to extract rents from state and local
governments. Id. Their findings indicated that franchise owners declared an existing facility
unsuitable because it was too small or too old or it lacked the amenities of luxury seats or suites
necessary to raise adequate revenues. Id. The owners reminded the cities that many other cities
would like to have a team and those other cities, desperate for a team, would build a stadium and
sweeten it with reduced rents. Id. The city with the lease would then promise a lavish new
stadium and/or a sweetheart lease to convince the present owners of the franchise to stay. Id. The
DXWKRUV¶ FRQFOXVLRQ RI WKHLU UHVHDUFh of the thirty-seven franchise cities suggested that attracting a
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chise would remain in the present locale. Rather than confront teams,
politicians and city council members have often buckled when owners have
threatened to move, and the politicians have demanded the public pay for
new suites, parking, or arenas and stadiums. Among the major cities and
teams that threatened to leave unless their demands were met were: New
York Yankees, Toronto Blue Jays, Seattle Mariners, Chicago White Sox,
San Diego Padres, Baltimore Orioles, New York Mets, and Florida
Marlins.41
The owners¶ demands that modern amenities be included within the
stadium design have created an amusement-style stadium, which increases
size and cost of construction. The trend is to build stadiums with fewer
seats but with more space for amenities such as: luxury suites;; premium
seating close to the field of play;; modern amenities, including amusement
parks and swimming pools;; concession enterprises like private restaurants
and souvenir shops;; private entrances for the exclusive high-end seats;;
private underground parking;; and sponsorship by private businesses which,
according to the records kept by the industry, will draw more fans to the
ball park. Owners argue that these new revenue sources are necessary to
compete and to survive economically in today¶s market.
III. CURRENT STATUS
Franchise owners recognize modern stadiums are enormously
expensive to build and, due to the inevitable issue that stadiums must now
be built in accordance with federal and state laws, financial backing and
support for future years must be forthcoming from the cities that have
acquired sport franchises.42 Prior to 1962, stadiums were built with private
professional sports franchise to a city and building that franchise a new stadium or arena will have
no effect on the growth rate of real per capita income and may reduce the level of real capita
income in that city. Id.
41. See MICHAEL J. KEANE, WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, STADIUM
FINANCE: GOVERNMENT¶S ROLE IN THE 1990S 6 (1996). Keane is a Research Analyst in
Wisconsin who developed a brochure for informational distribution in January 1996, when it
appeared that the strong link between major league sports and civic pride led cities without major
league teams to enter into competition with those that do have teams, offHULQJ WR PHHW WHDPV¶ UH-
quirements when host cities are reluctant to do so. Id. Such competition has added urgency to
questions of whether the benefits of professional sports are sufficient to merit the public in-
vestment necessary to retain the team. Id.;; see also Belson, supra note 37.
42. S. COUNSEL & RESEARCH, STADIUM DISCUSSION POINTS, http://www.senate.leg.state.
mn.us/departments/scr/report/stadium htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2011). The Minnesota Senate
Research unit developed a website that presented information with the intent to familiarize sen-
ators with major issues surrounding the complex topic of public subsidies for sports stadiums. Id.
This included the commitments both sides must agree to and the costs and features of a stadium,
as well as the non-stadium areas where funds could be tapped, including taxes and the revenue-
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funds. Since 1990, professional teams have convinced decision-makers and
civic leaders to build stadiums with public funds by threatening to move the
team to another city.43 With the use of expert negotiators, owners hope to
persuade civic leaders, with their joint cooperation, a new stadium could be
a win-win situation. Franchise owners do not want to face the heavy fin-
ancial burden of a single-purpose facility alone;; they need the backing of
community leaders, who have the power to gain the use of taxpayer money,
and politicians, who have the ability to take private land by governmental
condemnation at a lower price than might have been paid on the open
market and convert it to public use.44
However, taxpayers must also be convinced it is in their best interest to
spend tax dollars to subsidize private enterprise. The Minnesota Senate
Counsel and Research group has produced an informational website that
presents information with the intent to familiarize senators and interested
citizens with the major issues surrounding the complex topic of public sub-
sidies for sports stadiums.45

generating areas most often reserved for the owners²such as naming rights, parking fees, con-
cessions, and souvenirs. Id. It discussed the idea of lease or public ownership of the team and
also reminded the senators that the team has the option of leaving the state if an agreement cannot
be realized. Id.
The Minnesota Vikings partnered with the Minnesota State Lottery and the NFL on a
Vikings-themed game just before training in July 2010. See Vikings: Use Lotto Dollars to Help
Pay for Stadium, GRAND FORKS HERALD, Feb. 10, 2011, at B5. The game was a resounding
success in its first year, clearing twelve million dollars in total sales, and now the team hopes to
use some of the money generated to help pay for a new stadium. Id. The team has been in a year-
long fight at the state capitol to secure a new stadium to replace the outdated Metrodome. Costs
for a new stadium could approach $900 million, depending on a roof and other amenities. That
would mean roughly forty to sixty million dollars a year in public funds would be needed to help
pay for the project, a percentage of which the Vikings suggest could come from the lottery game.
Id.
43. Policy Debate: Does Public Investment in Municipal Sports Stadiums Pay Off?, ECON.
RESOURCE CENTER, http://www.swlearning.com/economics/policy_debates/stadiums html (last
visited Apr. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Policy Debate] (discussing the issues and arguments for and
against economical value of supporting public investments in sport stadiums);; see also Dobson,
supra note 1, at 485. The owner of the Minnesota Vikings, Zygi Wilf, announced that he had an
agreement with Anoka County in Minnesota to build a $675 million stadium as a new home for
the Minnesota Vikings. Dobson, supra note 1, at 485. The Vikings sought $790 million in total
funding because $115 million from the state would be designated for transportation infrastructure
surrounding the new stadium area. Id. at 485-86. These infrastructure projects, which included
widening Interstate 35-W in the suburbs north of Minneapolis and improving the on and off
ramps, were not scheduled to be added until 2020. Id. at 486 & n.2. The total proposal relied on
nearly $510 million of public money from Anoka County and $230 million from the State of
Minnesota. Id.
44. (PLQHQW GRPDLQ LV WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V SRZHU WR WDNH SULYDWH SURSHUW\ IRU SXEOLF XVH
provided that just compensation is paid for the property. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
45. See Policy Debate, supra note 43.
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Andrew Zimbalist and Roger Noll in their book, Sports, Jobs, and
Taxes,46 found since 1990, professional sports teams have been able to
negotiate with cities for around seventy percent publicly financed stadiums,
and this resulted in increased profits for the teams. 47 With private funding,
the franchise owners would recognize declining profits, declare they were
disadvantaged, and begin to search for a more lucrative venue for their
team.48 To assess the claim for subsidies, the authors examined the
economic impact of new stadiums and the presence of a sports franchise on
the local economy;; the authors then reviewed case studies of major and
minor league stadiums, as well as spring training facilities.49 From their
assessment of the cities with stadiums, the writers reached three primary
conclusions: sports teams and facilities are not a source of local economic
growth and employment;; the magnitude of the net subsidy exceeds the
financial benefit of a new stadium to a team;; and the most plausible reasons
that cities are willing to subsidize sports teams are the intense popularity
among the voters and business owners.50 Cities enjoy the leverage from the
monopoly of a professional sports league. Noll and Zimbalist concluded
that whatever the costs and benefits to a city of attracting a professional
team, there is no rationale whatsoever for the federal government to sub-
sidize the financial tug-of-war among the cities to host teams.51
While marketing their demands to civic leaders, team owners
determined the economic image they had projected had a significant
financial value to them, as well. Franchise owners, who were seeking to
capitalize on financial opportunities, realized certain revenue sources had to
be retained by the owners. The franchise entrepreneurs found inventive
46. See NOLL & ZIMBALIST, supra note 9. In the first section of Sports, Jobs and Taxes, the
authors explore the following general issues: the appropriate method for measuring economic
benefits and costs;; the source of the bargaining power of teams in obtaining subsidies from local
governments;; the local politics of attracting and retaining teams;; the relationship between sports
and local employment;; and the importance of stadium design in influencing the economic import
of a facility. In the second section, the authors present a number of essays that examine in detail
the relationship between professional sports and local economies in cities where owners or fran-
chise holders make growth claims based upon a new and lavish stadium. They attempt to answer
WKH TXHVWLRQ DV WR ZKHWKHU WKH SURVSHFWLYH WHDP RZQHUV¶ FODLPV ZLOO GHYHORS DQG ZKHWKHU WKHUH LV
a positive effect on economic growth in cities where they have built stadiums.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. In response to the recent growth in public subsidies of sports stadiums, many
independent economists have studied the effect on economic growth and collaborated with the
Noll and Zimbalist in order to share their findings. Id. The academic literature included in Sports,
Jobs, and Taxes on the economic benefits of sports stadiums concluded that there is no economic
growth associated with professional sports franchises and stadiums. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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ways of increasing and modifying revenues created from the great game,
which they coveted for themselves. One of these sources was the naming
rights to the stadium.52 A naming rights agreement is a contract between
the naming rights holder and a private entity, the corporate sponsor. Some
people argue the naming right should stay with the public and not be re-
linquished so easily to the team owners because the public bears most of the
cost of building the sports stadium.53 Fields and stadiums are no longer
named after heroes or as a symbol of honor.54 ³Naming rights are not to be
confused with honor. Honor is something bestowed upon you. It is not
something that you can insist is your due.´55
The major revenue remaining for owners to capitalize on was to
convince corporations to invest in the naming rights of the stadium. Thus,
revenues obtained from the naming rights have created a major part of the
operating revenue for the major league owners and teams. About ninety-
five percent of all sports facilities constructed since 1990 have a naming
rights contract.56 In 2008, fourteen major league teams received more than
$36.1 million per year from major enterprises that chose to pay to have their
trade name become the stadium¶s name.57 Corporations have eagerly
capitalized on the business opportunity presented to them by the team
owners. The price to have a corporation¶s name placed on sports stadiums
ranges from $4 million to over $200 million, with terms of the agreement
ranging five to thirty-one years after making the contract.58
52. See Mayer, supra note 1, at 196.
53. See Christian Maximilian Voigt, ³:KDW¶V 5HDOO\ LQ WKH 3DFNDJH RI D 1DPLQJ 5LJKWV
'HDO"´ 6HUYLFH Mark Rights and the Naming Rights of Professional Sports Stadiums, 11 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 327, 331-32 (2004).
54. Clyde Haberman, Field of Honor Becomes Field of Dollars, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2006,
DW % ³3XWWLQJ XS PRQH\ ZLWKRXW UHFHLYLQJ D ELOOERDUG LQ UHWXUQ LV DQ DOLHQ FRQFHSW LQ FRUSRUDWH
$PHULFD WRGD\´ Id. 0D\RU %ORRPEHUJ VWDWHG ³<RX GRQ¶W OLNH LW" :HOO JHW UHDO . . . . The real
world is that you have to have a naming opportunity and sell it for a lot of money, if you can
DIIRUG D VWDGLXP LQ WKLV GD\ DQG DJH´ Id.
55. Id.
56. See Ralph C. Anzivino, Reorganization of the Professional Sports Franchise, 12 MARQ.
SPORTS L. REV. 9, 56 (2001).
57. See Janet Frankston Lorin, Prices of Stadium Name Sponsorships Soar, USA TODAY
(Feb. 10, 2008, 2:48 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2008-02-10-716674597
B[ KWP ³1Dming rights prices are escalating for several reasons: public support to build stadiums
is waning, player salaries are increasing, and stadium constructions costs are risLQJ´  see also
The 2009 Banking Playoffs: Best Sports Stadiums Sponsorships, MYBANKTRACKER.COM (Aug.
31, 2009), http://www mybanktracker.com/bank-news/2009/08/31/the-2009-banking-playoffs-best
-sports-stadium-sponsorships/ (providing a complete list of banks and corporations that paid large
sums of money for the naming rights to sports stadiums in 2009);; Naming Giants, Jets Stadium
Could Set Record, MSNBC (Feb. 10, 2008, 7:26 PM), http://www msnbc msn.com/id/23098043/
ns/business-sports_biz/ [hereinafter Naming Giants].
58. See Naming Giants, supra note 57.
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IV. LAND ACQUISITION BY EMINENT DOMAIN
State constitutions have generally established the state law for eminent
domain issues that arise within the state. State eminent domain laws are
based primarily upon the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which states, ³No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law;; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation.´59 The federal government and
state legislatures have been given the authority to enforce such a law
because it was deemed necessary in order to protect private citizens from
having private property taken from them without just compensation.
However, it appears that this power has been abused.60 The average
citizen does not know nor understand how and why the government can
take private property from law-abiding citizens and convey it to private de-
velopers to build office parks, sports arenas, luxury condominiums, or retail
stores.61 As Scott Bullock, representing the Institute for Justice, has
publicly stated, ³Our cities and states have become like real estate
speculators, securing land owned by their own citizens on behalf of
politically connected private interests.´62 In a majority of the legal chal-
lenges in state courts, judges have found that expenditure of taxpayer
dollars for sports stadiums fulfilled a public purpose even though a sub-
stantial benefit would be realized by a private corporation. The challengers
ask that judges look at the true purpose of the stadium.63
A.

ORIGINAL PURPOSE FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN DOCTRINE

Courts have continued the trend of allowing municipalities to classify a
stadium as a public facility.64 Many stadium financing plans have
withstood challenges in state courts by relying upon the public purpose
doctrine. Nearly all states have adopted this doctrine to prevent the public

59. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
60. See generally DANA BERLINER, CASTLE COAL., GOVERNMENT THEFT: THE TOP 10
ABUSES OF EMINENT DOMAIN (2002).
61. Id.
62. Ira Carnahan, Domain Game, FORBES, Nov. 25, 2002, at 113.
63. Meyer v. City of Cleveland, 171 N.E. 606, 608 (Ohio Ct. App. 1930). The court rejected
WKH WD[SD\HU¶V DUJXPHQW WKDW WKH SXUSRVH ZDV IRU WKH EHQHILW RI WKH VSRUWV WHDP DQG QRW IRU WKH
benefit of the public. Id. The court pointed to the public entertainment and educational purposes
WKDW D VWDGLXP FRXOG SURYLGH DQG VWDWHG FLWLHV ³DUH QRW OLPLWHG WR SROLFLQJ WKH FLW\ WR SDYLQJ WKH
streets, to providing it with light, water, and sewers, docks, and markets. The power of cities and
towns to maintain institutions which educate and instruct as well as please and amuse their
inhabitants . .  LV XQTXHVWLRQHG´ Id. at 607-08.
64. See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005).
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funding of projects that benefit private entities rather than the state or its
citizens. The public purpose doctrine was originally designed in 1880 by
state legislators to curb corruption and exploitation of the public by
legislators and railroad developers. The concern of legislators in 1880 was
the same as the concern expressed by the angry taxpayers today who have
filed eminent domain actions. Courts have traditionally found the de-
termination of whether a stadium should be built with public financing is a
political issue rather than a judicial issue, so it is not surprising judicial
challenges to stadium funding plans nearly always fail. When such
challenges come before a court, judges have held the use of public funds to
build or improve sports stadiums is a legal expenditure for a legitimate
purpose.65
One of the government¶s chief duties is to protect the ³health, safety,
and general welfare´ of its citizens and, because of this purpose, courts have
had to determine when and why government can condemn land and put it in
the hands of civic leaders for the general welfare of the citizens.
Accordingly, most courts have held that many uses of private property are
³public uses.´ The government can utilize the public use requirement to
disguise the taking by merely forming a local agency and approving its
authority to formulate a plan to increase jobs and tax revenues.66
B. CURRENT USE OF PUBLIC POLICY DOCTRINE
Courts often defer to state legislatures and to state and municipal
agencies when determining what constitutes a public use or a public
purpose²often the words ³use,´ ³benefit,´ and ³purpose´ are used inter-
changeably even though the Fifth Amendment contains just the word
³use.´67 In some cases, courts have made a significant distinction by
stating: the public must have the right to resort to the land or property for
the use for which it was acquired, independently of the mere will or caprice
65. Id.
66. See Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 510 (Conn. 2004) (discussing the
authority of the New London Development Corporation to use the doctrine of eminent domain to
acquire privately owned land for building a technology complex and a state park that would raise
tax revenue and generate new jobs in New London, Connecticut);; see also Berman v. Parker, 348
86    GLVFXVVLQJ WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V YDOLGDWLRQ RI WKH FRQGHPQDWLRQ RI SXEOLF ODQG
LQ :DVKLQJWRQ '& HYHQ WKRXJK LW ZDV QRW XQVDQLWDU\ RU LQ D ³VOXP´ FRQGLWLRQ EHFDXVH WKH SODQ
for urban renewal was necessary for the public welfare).
67. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240-41 (2005) (stating the Supreme
Court does not recognize a distinction between public use and public purpose). The Supreme
Court recently reaffirmed Midkiff in June 2005 when it decided Kelo v. City of New London.
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488. However, the supreme courts of New York and Illinois do make a
distinction between public use and public purpose.
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of any private person or of any corporation in whom the title to the property
would vest upon condemnation.68
In the urban renewal context, so long as the redevelopment agency has
shown the area to be substandard, condemnation of private property for
urban renewal is a valid public purpose even if there is some benefit to a
private entity.69 However, the United States Supreme Court stated that
outside of the urban renewal context, condemnation of a private property
should not be a valid exercise of a municipality¶s eminent domain powers;;
if the use of land is ³only incidental and in large measure subordinate to the
private business[,] it does not fit within the context of urban renewal.´70
C.

RECENT CASES OF PUBLIC PURPOSE DOCTRINE

Eminent domain issues arise because of the value of land, and the
action usually involves the taking of private land for public use. An
eminent domain action may seem to be an illegal, arbitrary, and capricious
taking of another¶s land. However, the practice is allowed when the land is
needed for a public use, benefit, or purpose. Courts will approve an
eminent domain action if there is a clear and deliberate economic re-
juvenation plan that provides ample opportunity to succeed in a stated
purpose. Such plans must also purport to have sufficient public purpose,
such as tax dollars, new jobs, and other economic advantages.71
Such was the case in the 2005 landmark case, Kelo v. City of New
London.72 In Kelo, the City of New London, Connecticut formulated a re-
development plan that included condemnation of ninety acres of privately
owned land, which included private residences.73 Plaintiffs and other
residents in that area did not believe the plan had adequate evidence of

68. In re City of N.Y., 31 N.E. 1043, 1044 (N.Y. 1892);; see Kelo, 545 U.S. at 469 (noting
the public should be able to use the land regardless of how it is used by the new owner or the
agency who is in charge);; N.Y. City Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 1 N.E.2d 153, 154 (N.Y. 1936)
(stating legislative findings and determinations of public use are not conclusive on the courts, but
they are entitled at least to great respect because they relate to public conditions, which the
Legislature both by necessity and duty must have known).
69. Berman  86 DW  7KH &RXUW YDOLGDWHG :DVKLQJWRQ '&¶V FRQGHPQDWLRQ RI
public land even though the building on tKH ODQG ZDV QRW LQVDQLWDU\ QRU ZDV LW LQ D ³VOXP´
condition;; because the plan for urban renewal was necessary for the public welfare, the Court
deferred to the Legislature. Id.;; see also David M. Levitt, %UXFH 5DWQHU¶V $WODQWLF <DUGV 3URMHFW
Will Proceed, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 24, 2009, 4:35 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=allWv6R2YkIQ.
70. Berman, 348 U.S. at 33.
71. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 469-70.
72. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
73. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 469.
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³public purpose´ included in it to authorize the exercise of eminent domain
under federal constitutional principles.74
Because the primary issue in an eminent domain case is whether the
purportedly ³public purpose taking´ meets the public use requirement
intended by the Fifth Amendment, a court must decide whether the city¶s
development plan serves a public purpose.75 The Court in Kelo determined
that issue had been asked and answered by the judges in other cases, so it
limited its discussion to the topic of what constitutes a ³public purpose.´76
The Court focused on the distinction between private and public use rather
than on the question of whether economic development itself constituted a
public use.77 The Court noted the taking of the land, which would benefit
private parties, amounts to a public use as long as the public interest is para-
mount.78
In Kelo, one of the petitioners argued there was no public purpose in
the condemnation of his land.79 The Supreme Court pointed out the entire
ninety acres of land in Kelo must be considered as a whole and that the
Court should not isolate a single parcel of the condemned area.80 The Court
was then required to look at New London¶s actions and consider the city¶s
basis for using eminent domain on the entire tract of ninety acres.81 The
Kelo Court recognized the appellant¶s home was not ³blight,´ nor was there
any blight in the ninety acre area;; at the same time, the Court acknowledged
the fact that the New London area was sufficiently distressed, and a pro-
gram of economic rejuvenation was justified by New London¶s Economic
Development Department.82 The devised plan included the opportunity for
new jobs and increased tax revenue.83 The development planners pointed
out that economic development is a function of government.84 Thus, the
Supreme Court did not find New London¶s action to be arbitrary or
capricious.85 Rather, it determined the action for economic rejuvenation

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 475.
Id. at 480.
Id.
Id. at 485-87.
Id. at 486.
Id. at 484.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 483.
Id. at 474.
Id. at 484.
Id. at 490.
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was well planned, deliberate, and offered ample opportunity to consider the
ultimate results of the plan.86
However, four dissenting justices argued the majority decision was
incorrect.87 They argued New London¶s use of eminent domain was an
illegal taking.88 One should not be able to take property from A and give it
to B simply because the property would be more valuable in B¶s possession.
Justice O¶Connor wrote in her dissent, ³The majority held words µpublic
use¶ in the Fifth Amendment can mean wholly private use, so long as the
government expects it to yield some incidental µpublic benefits¶ such as tax
dollars, new jobs, maybe even esthetic pleasure.´89 Thus, the Supreme
Court, in a 5-4 decision, held economic development alone is sufficient to
meet the public use requirement of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.90 Shortly after the Kelo ruling, Alabama, Delaware, and Texas
signed legislation limiting the use of eminent domain;; however, the Texas
law made an explicit exemption for the use of eminent domain for the new
Dallas Cowboy¶s Stadium in Arlington, Texas.91
D. REGIONAL EXAMPLES OF STADIUM PROJECTS
Eminent domain is not the only reason that citizens have chosen to
challenge the taking of land. Sports complexes and arena development are
often areas where city developers and team owners have exploited using the
broad concept of public use. However, there are other reasons why pol-
iticians choose to modify the use of land. Sometimes it appears a different
use of the land may increase its value. When sites for new stadiums are
chosen, citizens have taken the local political leaders to court alleging
patterns of discrimination for the selection site. Poor districts and com-
munities often are forced to accept public facilities that are shunned by the
wealthier districts and communities. Other states, such as Michigan,92
86. Id. at 483-84.
87. Id. DW  2¶&RQQRU - GLVVHQWLQJ 
88. Id.
89. Id. at 501.
90. Id. at 483-84 (majority opinion).
91. CASTLE COAL., 50 STATE REPORT CARD TRACKING EMINENT DOMAIN SINCE KELO 5,
12, 47 (2007), available at http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/publications/report_card/50_State_
Report.pdf.
92. See generally Cnty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004);; Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981). In Hathcock, the judges
developed a three-pronged test for determining whether eminent domain taking of private property
was constitutional. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 781. The three prongs for the test are: (1) if the
land taken for public use is needed by railroads to lay a straight track;; (2) when governmental
oversight forces the need for the taking of land;; and (3) when the land is taken because of blighted
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Massachusetts,93 California,94 Wisconsin,95 Minnesota,96 Pennsylvania,97
Washington,98 and Illinois,99 have taken political leaders to court because of
a decision that seemed unfair, unnecessary, and discriminatory.

conditions. Id. at 781-83. Meeting any one of these conditions will create public use of private
land. Id. at 783. In Poletown, Judge Ryan, who wrote a dissent, suggested the court should take
heightened scrutiny when he characterized the affirmaWLYH YRWH DV ³SODFLQJ D MXGLFLDO LPSULPDWXU
XSRQ JRYHUQPHQW DFWLRQ WDNHQ XQGHU WKH SROLF\ RI WKH HQG MXVWLI\LQJ WKH PHDQV´ Poletown, 304
N.W.2d at 456.
93. See City of Springfield v. Dreison Inv., Inc., Nos. 19991318, 991230, 000014, 2000 WL
782971, at *47 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 2000) (determining that the primary beneficiary of the
FLW\¶V FRQWULEXWLRQ WR WKH HPLQHQW GRPDLQ DFWLRQ ZDV not the public). The decision, though it dis-
cussed public use, largely turned on improper diversion of city funds. Id.
94. See City of Anaheim v. Michel, 66 Cal. Rptr. 543, 545-46 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (allowing
FRQGHPQDWLRQ RI SULYDWH SURSHUW\ IRU H[SDQVLRQ RI VWDGLXP¶V SDUNLQJ Iacilities based upon
VWDWXWRU\ DXWKRULW\ WKDW RSHUDWLRQ RI ³SXEOLF DVVHPEO\ IDFLOLWLHV´ LV D SXEOLF XVH 
95. See Libertarian Party of Wis. v. State, 546 N.W.2d 424, 428, 440 (Wis. 1996) (upholding
the Wisconsin Stadium Act, based upon legislative findings regarding the public purposes to be
served by a professional baseball stadium).
96. See /LIWHDX Y 0HWUR 6SRUWV )DFLOLWLHV &RPP¶Q  1:G  -52, 757 (Minn.
1978) (affirming public financing of the reconstruction of a baseball and football stadium when
Minnesota legislation adequately protected WKH SXEOLF¶V Lnterests and imposed conditions to be met
before public monies could be expended).
97. See Martin v. City of Phila., 215 A.2d 894, 896 (Pa. 1966). The Martin court adopted the
view tKDW D VWDGLXP KDV DQ LQKHUHQWO\ SXEOLF QDWXUH FLWLQJ WKH ORZHU FRXUW¶V UDWLRQDOH WKDW SXEOLF
purposes are not limited to municipal purposes, such as streets, water, sewers, and police pro-
tection. Id. Instead, public purposes encompass anything relating to public education, recreation,
or pleasure, including museums, parks, libraries, and gardens;; a sports stadium also falls under
this umbrella because it is public recreation, and all of this helps to build a healthy community.
Id. (YHQ LI WKH VWDGLXP¶s primary use were to be by privately owned clubs, this would not conflict
ZLWK WKH VWDGLXP¶V SXEOLF QDWXUH Id.;; see also Conrad v. City of Pittsburgh, 218 A.2d 906, 908
(Pa. 1966).
98. See King Cnty. v. Taxpayers of King Cnty., 949 P.2d 1260, 1273 (Wash. 1997) (dis-
cussing the issue arising in Seattle when citizens voted not to fund a new stadium to replace the
Kingdome);; see also Belson, supra note 37 (noting King County residents owe more than eighty
million dollars for the Kingdome, which was razed in 2000). This is happening in other cities
where residents are paying for stadiums and arenas that were abandoned by the teams for which
they were built.
99. See Friends of the Parks v. Chi. Park Dist., 786 N.E.2d. 161, 181 (Ill. 2003). In Friends
of the Parks, the plaintiffs argued that issuance of debt proportionately favored the Bears NFL
franchise when refurbishing Soldier Field in Chicago, thus violating the section of the Illinois
Constitution that forbids public funds from being used for private purposes. Id. In line with the
Supreme Court in Meyer, the Supreme Court of Illinois deferred to the Legislature to determine
what constitutes a public purpose. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court, like courts in other
jurisdictions, took an expansive view of the concept of public benefit. Id. By the court making
findings of public benefit that may turn out to be false, the Legislature was able to shift the burden
of proving that the project would primarily benefit a private entity to the opponents. Id. The
Illinois court stated:
[i]t is historically clear that Soldier Field has served public purposes since its
dedication in 1924. It will continue to do so after the completion of the Burnham Park
project as authorized by the Act. A financial benefit accruing to the Bears, standing
alone, does not diminish the fact that the renovated Soldier Field will be used and en-
joyed by the public for a wide variety of public purposes, whether or not the projected
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Miami

In Miami, politicians were faced with determining who should receive
the benefits of the community¶s tax money raised for the purpose of im-
proving the city and state and encouraging tourists and visitors to bring new
money to the area. This created a dilemma for the city leaders. In
November 2008, Miami was faced with a major decision when two major
improvement projects in Miami and Dade County wanted to use the tax
money that was raised for developing visitor spending. The query to be an-
swered was: is it wiser to invest community resources in a baseball stadium
for a team that has threatened to move unless a new stadium is built, or
would it be more beneficial to make needed improvements to the Dade
County Convention Center, which could bring thousands of visitors into the
Miami area?100 Exacerbating the situation was the threat by the Florida
Marlins to leave Miami if the city would not agree to build a new stadium.
Supporters of both projects, the Dade County Convention Center and
the Florida Marlins, presented plausible reasons why they should be re-
warded. The owners of the Marlins wanted a new and modern baseball
stadium that would require an investment of approximately $650 million,

positive effects on jobs and the local economy generally result as predicted by the
legislature.
Id.;; see also Larimore v. Ill. Sports Facilities Auth., No. 89 C 1067, 1996 WL 153672, at *1081
(D. Ill. Apr. 1, 1996). The legal issue in Larimore was where the new stadium would be built. Id.
Chicago City Council members determined the site should be near the old Comiskey Park. Id. In
order to acquire the land needed, the City Council condemned property in a neighborhood known
as South Armour. Id. The Illinois General Assembly passed legislation in 1988 to build the base-
ball stadium directly across the street from Comiskey Park. Id. The White Sox wanted a different
area but agreed to build where the Legislature indicated, but they needed more space than was in
the legislation. Id. The White Sox threatened to move to Florida if they did not receive more
land. Id. The only available land site in the condemned neighborhood was the park, which had
been set aside for recreation for the children and families. Id. Families living in the apartment
complex in South Armour believed the park belonged to the neighborhood because they had to
struggle to have it designated park space, and they did not want to give up without a fight. Id.
The African-Americans living in South Armour argued the condemnation was racially motivated.
Id. After hearing oral arguments and providing a lengthy analysis of the issues, the court rejected
WKH SODLQWLIIV¶ FODLPs of racial bias. Id. 7KH FRXUW FODLPHG PRVW RI WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V RIILFLDOV ZKR
approved the land site were African-American and there was a race-neutral explanation for the
decision to build the new ball park in South Armour Park²evidently the park had not been used
by families but by gangs of juveniles and young adults and was a familiar trouble spot on the
south side of Chicago. Id. The court determined that by building the new ballpark on the South
Armour Park location, it was the least expensive means of keeping the Chicago White Sox in
Chicago. Id. U.S. Cellular Park opened approximately three years after the Illinois General
Assembly passed legislation to build the park directly across the street from Comisky Park.
100. See Michael Lewis, Hidden Costs, Giveaways Top List of 32 Added Stadium Pitfalls,
MIAMI TODAY, Feb. 12, 2009, http://www miamitodaynews.com/news/090212/story-viewpoint.
shtml (commenting on the announced plan for the Marlin stadium to be built and ready for oc-
cupancy in 2013).
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plus additional dollars for infrastructure modifications. They used the
common argument that in order to draw the fans, they must have the same
amenities as other new stadiums;; in order to build the stadium, they needed
public financing. However, a group of citizens argued the city and county
should invest the tax money in the project proposed for improving Dade
County Convention Center. They argued a convention center would draw
thousands of visitors to Miami, which was what the tax was aimed at²
³bringing visitors and new money to Miami and Dade County.´101
Michael Lewis, publisher of Miami Today, argued that building the
ballpark could cost the county $3 billion per year.102 He suggested, one of
the key criteria in determining how to invest a community¶s resources
should be an examination of how the spending would improve the area¶s
economy and reduce the doldrums.103 His conclusion was if the Miami
decision-makers were to fund the proposed new baseball stadium, it would
show a lack of fiscal responsibility by officials willing to hand over hun-
dreds of millions of dollars to achieve little.104 Lewis concluded it is
doubtful a new stadium will draw fans to Miami.105 In new stadiums built
with public funds, the owners are pocketing all the stadium¶s financial
benefit;; a closer study would likely find more costs than benefits for
Miami.106 On Friday, February 12, 2009, the plan to build a $609 million-
plus stadium for the Florida Marlins was about to be voted on, and the
Chairman of the Commissioners of the County remarked, ³[I]f it¶s
financially feasible to build a baseball stadium, I think it¶s something we
need to do because it¶s an economic stimulus project.´107 The Mayor of
Miami, Carlos Alverez, added, ³[T]here is no better use for these tourist
dollars than to build a world-class baseball facility that will be the envy of
the nation.´108

101. See Michael Lewis, Building Ballpark Could Cost County $3 Billion Every Year,
MIAMI TODAY, Nov. 20, 2008, http://www miamitodaynews.com/news/081120/story-viewpoint.
shtml.
102. Id.
103. See id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Risa Polansky, Financial Questions Remain as Miami, County Commissioners Prepare
for Friday Vote on Marlins Stadium Deal, MIAMI TODAY, Feb. 12, 2009, http://www.
miamitodaynews.com/news/090212/story2.shtml;; accord Miami-'DGH /HDYHV 0DUOLQV¶ %DOOSDUN
Future up to City, USA TODAY, Mar. 2, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/nl/
marlins/2009-03-02-miami-ballpark_N htm?loc=interstitialskip.
108. Polansky, supra note 107.
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Washington D.C.

In December 2004, Washington, D.C. and Major League Baseball
agreed to a public financing package to build a 41,888 seat baseball sta-
dium, which would allow the former Montreal Expos to move to the United
States capital.109 The redevelopment plan spearheaded the revitalization of
the corridor of Washington, D.C. near the Navy Yard and the Anacostia
waterfront.110 Washington, D.C. city leaders condemned the land where the
new Washington Nationals Park would be erected;; it was a rat-infested
warehouse district that visitors avoided because it was unsafe for ped-
estrians.111 The city planners had a plan to build on the side of the interstate
in the once forsaken area separating the district known as ³The Hill´ from
what used to be a neighborhood notable for its run-down public housing,
low-slung industrial buildings, and a handful of run-down warehouse dance
clubs.112
In February 2006, the Washington, D.C. City Council capped the city¶s
expenditures on the project at $611 million, though the land acquisition and
other costs eventually drove the price to $693 million.113 The state of the
art baseball park opened as planned in 2008, but the lavish entertainment
district that was planned has not materialized. In fact, there are only empty
spaces nearby and two empty office buildings hoping for tenants soon.
Moreover, when fans approached the stadium in 2009, they saw a thirty-
five foot hole in the ground owned by Monument Realty, which had to put
its plans on hold after beginning its development.114
The plans for developing Capitol River Front, the area around the
Washington Nationals Stadium, has experienced a setback. In 2004, it was
announced that the plans for the area included a waterfront park, retail and
professional offices, and condos in modern high rise buildings, designed to
attract young professionals, couples without children, and empty nesters.
The plans for Half Street, next to the stadium, were a mixed-use de-
velopment with restaurants, bars, retail shops, and entertainment venues.
The street would be closed to traffic on game-day, providing space to

109. 6HH 1DWLRQDO¶V 3DUN±New DC Baseball Stadium, JDLAND, http://www.jdland.com/DC/
stadium.cfm (last visited Mar. 23, 2011).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Dana Hedgpeth & David Nakamura, At Nationals Park, District of Dreams Hits a
Slump, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2009/04/11/AR2009041102036 html.
114. Id.
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browse or relax before and after games. During the off-season, the space
would be used to host events and festivals. The plan for the massive re-
development effort is projected to take ten years.115
However, the best laid plans often go astray, as they did in
Washington, D.C. When the plans for a new stadium were announced, de-
velopers flocked to the southwest side of the city, and the land sold like
wild fire. However, the financial picture changed abruptly, and the credit
crisis left builders and developers unable to secure loans and credit for
developing the area. Since the development of the area has slowed down,
the stadium management has increased food services within the baseball
park and added entertainment in the fun zone, but fans looking out from the
ballpark in any direction can see projects that have been started have slowed
due to the credit crisis.
There is a new metro stop near the Navy Yard, within a one mile walk
to the Capitol Building, the congressional offices, and Barracks Row en-
tertainment district. The public housing area of the district, which was
rundown, was to include new homes built in the classic style of row houses
or stand-alone houses. The city paid for new roads, sidewalks, and parks,
committing a total of approximately $1 billion to prepare for the projected
development.116
3.

New York

New York is an example of a city that allows politics to determine how
to spend money the city and metropolitan area has not yet raised. Three of
the more elaborate political agreements involving the building of new
sports stadiums have been made in the last few years involving the City and
State of New York. Mayor Giuliani signed agreements to build two $800
million stadiums: one with the New York Yankees and one with the New
York Mets, both of which were scheduled to open between 2009 and
2010.117 The agreements were withdrawn by Mayor Michael Bloomberg,
Giuliani¶s successor, days after taking office.118 The reason for the stop
order on the stadium decisions was New York City¶s fiscal officers pro-
jected New York would experience a $4 billion deficit in each of the years

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See Charles V. Bagli, $V 6WDGLXPV¶ &RVWV 6ZHOO %HQHILWV LQ 4XHVWLRQ, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
3, 2008, http://www nytimes.com/2008/11/04/nyregion/04stadiums html.
118. Id.
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2002 through 2005, and the new mayor thought they were too expensive
during a recession.119
Three years later, Mayor Bloomberg unveiled his own plan calling for
the New York Yankees and the New York Mets to pay the construction
costs of their new stadiums while the city would build public parks, parking
garages, and transit stations near the ballparks.120 The mayor suggested that
the cost to the taxpayers would be relatively small and the benefits to the
city would be great. Bloomberg stated, ³We don¶t do subsidies. The city is
getting paid back at a profit.´121
Yet, as the two stadiums neared completion, the costs were anything
but small once the project was reviewed. Construction costs were
approximately $1 billion each, and the cost to the city for infrastructure im-
provements²parks, garages, and transit stations²had increased sig-
nificantly to $458 million from the $281 million projected in 2005.122 The
state was contributing an additional $201 million.123 These figures did not
include an estimated $480 million in city, state, and federal tax breaks
granted to both teams.124 In addition, both stadiums are located on land
owned by New York City;; according to the negotiated agreement, neither
team would be paying rent or property taxes.125
a.

Yankee Stadium

The construction costs of the new Yankee Stadium were estimated to
be $1.8 billion.126 The agreement between the Yankees and the city
includes the following provisions. First, the city will retain ownership of all
the land that currently houses both the existing Yankee Stadium and the
proposed structures of the new Yankee Stadium, including the proposed
garages.127 Second, the city agreed the Yankees will not have to pay any
rent or taxes.128 Third, the new Yankee Stadium was built on ground that
was being used by two very popular public parks. Thus, New York City
agreed to replace lost park land along the Hudson River at Macomb¶s Dam

119.
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and at Mullaly Park by resurfacing the top of the underground garages with
artificial grass;; however, during ball games²eighty-one days between
April and October²this area would be used for parking vehicles.
Additionally, the city agreed to further develop the smaller park areas along
the waterfront about one-half mile from the stadium site. The city also
agreed to replace a soccer field, a baseball diamond, basketball courts, and a
track. The estimated cost of replacing those parks and play areas has in-
creased from $129.2 million in 2005, when the agreement was made, to
$177 million.129 Fourth, the cost to the city to build garages for stadium
parking would be approximately $170 million, and the cost to demolish the
old stadium would be in the tens of millions of dollars. The city is also re-
sponsible for paying sixty-five million dollars in infrastructure costs and
design and planning costs for the stadium, which accrued since the
agreement was entered into in 2005.130 Fifth, to raise funding for the new
stadium, New York City issued $225 million in tax-exempt bonds in 2007,
which the Yankees owners agreed to pay in ³lieu of taxes.´131 Sixth, the
Yankees owners arranged for the lease to be classified as an operating lease;;
thus, they will keep significantly more revenue and will not have to share it
with the rest of the Major League.132
In 2005 and 2006, when negotiations were in the early stages, the pro-
jection was that the Yankees project would cost about $1 billion. The
team¶s franchise owners would pay eighty percentor $800 million for the
stadium, while the city and state would contribute $208.6 million for parks
and garages.133 It appeared Mayor Bloomberg¶s plan was a good deal.
However, the projected costs proved not to be actual costs. From 2006 to
2008, the stadium and infrastructure costs increased greatly. In 2008, the
projected costs of the Mets project was about $900 million, and the
Yankees project was expected to be more than $1.7 billion.134 The rising
costs meant public costs would grow as well.135
The subsidies, which Mayor Bloomberg said were not being given to
the franchise owners for the stadium, have created community outrage
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See John R. Middleton, Jr., Scott L. Walker & Matthew Savare, Stadia Mania: The
Business, Civic and Legal Issues of New Stadium Construction±Part I, METROPOLITAN
CORPORATE COUNSEL, Feb. 2008.
132. Andrew Zimbalist, Financing a New Yankee Stadium, BASEBALL PROSPECTUS, Jan. 30,
2006, http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=4732.
133. Bagli, supra note 117.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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because New York City has been in an economic meltdown that has crip-
pled the city¶s budget. The city has cut thousands of working-class jobs
while the Yankees doled out $423.5 million in salaries to three players.136
Mayor Bloomberg answered the community¶s inquiries regarding the add-
itional millions of dollars being spent stating, ³[K]eeping the Yankees in
the Bronx and the Mets in Queens not only creates temporary construction
and permanent stadium jobs, but also is crucial to the city¶s image.´137
b.

CitiField

As of September 27, 2008, the CitiField sign hangs above the Jackie
Robinson Rotunda. The new stadium in Queens was eighty-five percent
completed when the CitiField sign appeared. This stadium replaced the
forty-four year old Shea Stadium as the home of the New York Mets.
Mayor Bloomberg and the Economic Development Corporation had a
multi-billion dollar plan to redevelop the sixty-one acre site of Willets
Point, a rundown section of Queens bordering on Shea Stadium.138 The
proposed plan to build a new baseball stadium on the site of Shea Stadium
in Queens included creating an environmentally friendly residential and
commercial community along 126th Street, which runs in front of Shea
Stadium.139 The plan involved transforming the area into a strip of cafes
and shops.140
CitiField is clearly not a bare-bones functional structure like Shea
Stadium. It has a brick exterior, archways, a rotunda similar to Ebbets
Field, and plans include shops and a museum in the public area. Although
Shea Stadium was part of the 1964 World¶s Fair, it lacked signature
features like the overhanging upper deck frieze of Yankee Stadium or the
Green Monster of Fenway Park in Boston, Massachusetts.141
In 1964, the ballpark in Queens was completed. It had moveable seats
on a buried track, so it was easily converted into a football stadium. The
stadium featured a circular design, an outfield without bleachers, and tun-
nels leading to the seating area.142 The city had instructed the architect and

136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Sophia Hollander, Imagining a Place Where Cheers Never End, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9,
2008.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Richard Sandomir, 6WDGLXP¶V $SSHDO /D\ LQ )XWXULVWLF )XQFWLRQDOLW\, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
27, 2008, http://www nytimes.com/2008/09/28/sports/baseball/28sandomir html.
142. Id.
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developer to ³design and build it for $15 million and make it convertible for
two sports.´143 The final cost exceeded the allotted amount by fifteen
million dollars.144
The Agreement/Financing Plan with New York City and the franchise
owners of the New York Mets will include public financing with the sale of
bonds, both taxable and non-taxable. The following highlights features of
the Agreement:
1. The project will be subsidized by granting the Mets [owners]
access to tax exempt bond financing which will save the [owners]
approximately $105 million over the next forty [40] years.
2. New York City will invest $105 million for infrastructure and
capital improvements, including site preparation, demolishing of
Shea Stadium, and the paving of parking lots . . . . [New York
City] will raise this money by issuing bonds and paying the prin-
cipal and interest with general city [funds].
3. The State of New York will contribute $70 million for [the
stadium¶s] infrastructure.
4. The new stadium will be exempt from [New York City] pro-
perty tax.
5. The stadium will be exempt from city, state, and Metropolitan
Transportation Authority sales taxes on . . . construction materials,
fixtures, and equipment.
6. [New York City] will forgo a [percentage or] portion of the
stadium¶s parking revenue.
7. [The owners of the New York Mets] will receive increased rent
credits.
8. [Both New York City and New York State] will make direct
³capital replacement´ payments into a reserve fund for the
stadium.
9. [New York City] has granted the [owners of] the Mets a
mortgage-recording tax exemption.
10. [The owners] will [not pay] rent for the use of the . . . stadium,
[but] will pay [for the stadium] maintenance.145

143. Id.
144. See id.
145. Middleton et, al,, supra note 131.
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In total direct subsidies, exemptions, and bond financing, the Mets
owners will save approximately $276 million while New York City will ex-
perience $155 million in lost revenue;; it will cost the State of New York
eight-nine million dollars in lost revenue.146 This is in comparison to the
financial plan of the Yankees where the owners received $276 million in
benefits over a cost to the city of $170 million and to the state of eighty five
million dollars.147
One news article reported the struggling Citigroup is slated to pay $400
million for naming rights during the next twenty years to the team owners
of the New York Mets.148 Citigroup¶s sign above the main scoreboard, the
first of several, was ample proof of the multi-million dollar agreement for
the naming rights of the ballpark.149 Citigroup made the commitment years
ago, in November 2006, when it was ³flush´ with cash.150 Citigroup and
the New York Mets¶ Chief Operating Officer have said they have no plan to
alter the naming rights deal even though the bank is receiving billions of
dollars in federal aid.151 Economists who question the economic value of a
stadium accept the Bloomberg administration may have made a better deal
for taxpayers than those deals made in other cities. But, economists say the
stadiums still carry an immense public cost, and eighty-one home games in
each park will not create many permanent jobs.152
c.

New Jersey Nets

The third new sports stadium issue surfaced in Brooklyn just recently
when the New Jersey Nets were purchased by a real estate developer, Bruce
C. Ratner, and his associates.153 As soon as the purchase was approved, the
new owners announced they were moving the basketball team from New
Jersey to Brooklyn.154 Ratner¶s group has a detailed plan for commercial
and residential development around the proposed arena. However, it faced
opposition from community groups and elected officials who opposed the
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Richard Sandomir, Citigroup Puts Its Money Where Its Name Will Be, N.Y. TIMES, July
20, 2008, http://www nytimes.com/2008/07/20/sports/baseball/20sandomir html?_r=1&partner=
rssnyt&emc=rss.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See Bagli, supra note 117.
153. See Levitt, supra note 69.
154. See id.
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size and scale of the project.155 A group of tenants and owners claim the
seizure is unconstitutional.156 They argued Ratner¶s proposed $4.9 billion
Atlantic Yards project mainly enriches private interests, and the New York
Constitution requires a public use for land taken by eminent domain.157 The
tenants also argued that it is not an area that is blighted or in unsanitary con-
ditions.158 They claimed the takings are for private use by the developer
and that the plan only enriches private interests.159
On November 24, 2009 the Court of Appeals of New York ruled that
the state could use eminent domain to force homeowners and businesses to
sell their property for a massive development in Brooklyn that includes a
new arena for the Nets basketball team.160 The vote was 6-1, and Judge
Lippman, who wrote the majority decision, said, ³The Constitution accords
government broad power to take and clear substandard and insanitary areas
for redevelopment. In so doing, it commensurately deprives the Judiciary
of grounds to interfere with the exercise.´161
The court approved the use of eminent domain, holding that conditions
were such that there were public benefits to cleaning up the area. 162 Sheila
McGraph, a real estate analyst, commented this was the last significant
hurdle for the development project, and the ruling provides ³additional
visibility on the value proposition of the project, avoids significant write-
off, and assists in marketing Barclays Center bonds.´163 Mayor Bloomberg
remarked, ³The state court ruled in favor of the city because this is a project
the city really needs . . . . It gives us another great venue for the big
events . . . ´164
d.

Oakland

The newest baseball stadium to be proposed is the Oakland Athletics
Cisco Park in Fremont, California, twelve miles from San Jose, on a 143
acre parcel of land in the Oakland area known as the Pacific Commons.
Several sites have been proposed for the new ballpark, though the threat
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looms the club might move from the Oakland area if a site is not de-
termined soon.165 Throughout 2010, the Oakland Athletics have struggled
in their attempt to construct a new stadium. Oakland city officials have re-
peatedly indicated they want to keep the Oakland Athletics in their city.
The team owner, Len Wolff, continues to focus his attention on San Jose,
which may indicate a franchise move. However, Major League Baseball
management has not yet decided to allow the team to move.166 San Jose has
proposed a site, and Wolff has stated he is willing to privately finance the
$461 million ballpark there.167
The stadium design will have all of the modern amenities, including
suites of various sizes.168 The outfield concourses will be public streets that
will close shortly before the game. The surrounding area will have
numerous fan amenities and interactive opportunities. Food vendors will
have a wide choice of specialty foods, and sit-down restaurants and clubs
will be situated so there will be a continuous view of the playing field.169
Though the naming rights to this stadium have already been negotiated and
the Athletics and Cisco Networking have signed a thirty-year naming rights
package, ground-breaking has not been set because approval of the site has
not yet been obtained.170 On January 14, 2009, it was reported baseball
Commissioner Bud Selig had given the Oakland Athletics permission to
³discuss a ballpark with other communities if officials in Fremont,
California, didn¶t quickly approve a proposed new stadium.´171
The Athletics plan to build a ballpark in Fremont, California, at a cost
of approximately $500 million, which would be paid primarily from private
funds, but the team has yet to win the approval of Fremont¶s officials. Selig
added:
I cannot stress enough that the need for the A¶s to have a viable
and modern stadium is a paramount objective for your or-
ganization and for the game overall. The A¶s currently operate in
one of the least desirable venues in Major League Baseball and it

165. Athletics Ballpark, BALLPARKS OF BASEBALL, http://www.ballparksofbaseball.com/
future/AthleticsBallpark htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2011).
166. Id.
167. Id.
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171. 6HOLJ :DQWV )UHPRQW WR $SSURYH $¶V %DOOSDUN, USA TODAY, Jan. 14, 2009, http://www.
usatoday.com/sports/baseball/al/athletics/2009-01-14-athleticsstadium_N htm?loc=interstitialskip.
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has placed your club at a serious disadvantage with respect to other
clubs in the game.172
V. ADDITIONAL FUNDING ISSUES
Most state constitutions include an article that prohibits giving or
loaning state money to private corporations or associations.173 The same
constitutional provision also prohibits state actors from using state credit to
subsidize a stadium. Therefore, the legality of investing public tax dollars
by local governmental agencies in order to subsidize the building of a
stadium for private corporations or associations has been challenged by tax-
payers.174 Lawsuits raised by concerned citizens and legislators attack the
use of tax-exempt bonds, the predominant method of financing the sta-
diums. They object primarily because public subsidies to fund the stadiums

172. Id.
173. See N.D. CONST. art. X, § 18. On December 17, 1998, the North Dakota Attorney
General issued an opinion stating:
The use of public funds is restricted by a number of state and federal constitutional
provisions including Article X, Section 18 of the North Dakota Constitution, the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and its North Dakota
counterpart, Article 1, Section 16.
Article X, Section 18 of the North Dakota Constitution provides:
The state, any county or city may make internal improvements and may engage
in any industry, enterprise or business, . . . but neither the state nor any political
subdivision thereof shall otherwise loan or give its credit or make donations to or
in aid of any individual, association or corporation except for reasonable support
of the poor, nor subscribe to or become the owner of capital stock in any
association or corporation.
The North Dakota Supreme Court has construed Article X, Section 18 as . . .
SURKLELW>LQJ@ WKH VWDWH RU SROLWLFDO VXEGLYLVLRQ WR ³RWKHUZLVH´ ORDQ RU JLYH LWV
credit or make donations . . . .
Under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a state may
QRW ³GHSULYH DQ\ SHUVRQ RI OLIH OLEHUW\ RU SURSHUW\ ZLWKRXW GXH SURFHVV RI ODZ´
1RUWK 'DNRWD¶V &RQVWitution contains a similar provision in Article I, Section 16.
Under these constitutional provisions, a state may expend public funds only for public
purposes . . . . The legality of a given expenditure under these two due process
constitutional provisions thus turns on whether it is primarily for a private or public
purpose.
³$ SXEOLF SXUSRVH RU EXVLQHVV KDV IRU LWV REMHFWLYH WKH SURPRWLRQ RI the public
health, safety, morals, general welfare, security, prosperity and contentment of all the
inhabitants or resiGHQWV ZLWKLQ D JLYHQ VXEGLYLVLRQ´
...
With reference to governmental policy and constitutional provisions restricting
taxation or the contracting of public debts, this term . . . does not include the building
and maintenance of state institutions.
1' 2S $WW¶\ *HQ -F-30 (1998) (internal citations omitted).
174. See N.D. CONST. art. X, § 18.
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give major benefits to team owners while placing the risk of debt upon
cities and states and, consequently, the taxpayers.
The owners¶ laissez-faire attitude has been often criticized by fans, but
team owners have simply followed their best business interests. Various
judicial holdings have emboldened owners of professional sports teams.
Owners realize that fan support increases the value of their franchise;; how-
ever, the judicial decisions, including the antitrust decisions, have created a
seller¶s market, inspiring the owners to make the best deal possible.
While some observers remain dubious, owners and major supporters of
new stadiums have convinced government officials, potential investors, and
key community leaders that new stadiums with modern amenities generate
additional economic activity, create new jobs, and encourage commercial
and residential development in the area surrounding a new stadium. Some
question the propriety of building stadiums with public dollars when studies
indicate there is only a remote economic impact to the communities.175
Nevertheless, team owners and league officials have persuaded state and
city legislatures that professional teams will provide jobs and inject millions
of dollars into the economy of an area.
When a state or municipality issues a bond to fund a stadium, the tax-
payers are subsidizing the cost of construction by assuming the debt.
Economists speculate that the public benefit argument is highly exaggerated
and, while increased spending at a sports stadium may produce some local
economic activity, there is very little ³new´ activity.176 The money, which
would have gone into the municipality coffers in another manner, goes into
the spending at or near the stadium, and the benefits are shared by the
municipality and the owners. Thus, the municipality has suffered lost
revenue because they have to share it with the owners.
Several pieces of legislation designed to prevent subsidizing schemes
have been presented to Congress for consideration.177 This legislation was
introduced at the federal level because, when states subsidize construction
costs, the federal government also becomes a victim.178 None of the bills
submitted to Congress have been enacted. Perhaps lobbying by pro-
fessional leagues and commissioners, coupled with the Government
Finance Officers Association¶s argument that federal action would interfere

175. KEVIN DELANEY & RICK ECKSTEIN, PUBLIC DOLLARS, PRIVATE STADIUMS, BATTLES
OVER BUILDING SPORTS STADIUMS 23 (2003).
176. Id.
177. Id.
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with states¶ rights to make financing decisions affecting their jurisdictions,
were persuasive.
A. BALTIMORE/INDIANAPOLIS
Finally, because the trend for new luxurious stadiums began in
Baltimore, it is only fitting to discuss what happened in Baltimore when
another city offered the team a better opportunity. The Baltimore Colts, a
major sports team, threatened to leave Baltimore if the city did not meet the
team¶s demands for a new stadium built only for football. Baltimore did
not agree to the owner¶s terms, and Robert Irsay took the team and all of its
possessions to Indianapolis in the middle of the night in March of 1984.179
The team settled in to play its games at Hoosier Dome, which was renamed
RCA Dome in 1984.180
The Colts became unhappy with the Hoosier Dome in Indianapolis and
wanted to have all the amenities of the newer stadiums. The team es-
pecially wanted more luxury suites because such suites are a major source
of revenue reserved by the team. Without a new home, chances of a Super
Bowl being played in Indianapolis were slim. Indianapolis and the State of
Indiana agreed to support the team by building a new stadium.181
The construction of Lucas Oil Stadium, named in 2006, began in
2005.182 The stadium is a state of the art facility with a retractable roof and
the elements of kinetic architecture that provide for a speedy conversion of
the facility to accommodate a variety of events.183 This conversion facility
allows increased use of the building and increased return on the investment.
Lucas Oil Stadium opened in August 2008 and replaced the RCA Dome as
the home of the Indianapolis Colts.184
The approximate cost of constructing the stadium was $720 million and
was to be financed by Indianapolis and Indiana.185 There were arguments
and debates among politicians about where they could find funding for the
stadium.186 Some politicians favored gaming to raise the funds, and others
179. History of the Indianapolis Colts, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, http://www2.indystar.com/
library/factfiles/sports/football-pro/indpls_colts/history/colts html (last visited Mar. 21, 2011).
180. Id.
181. Michele McNeil, State OKs Deal with City and Colts, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Sept. 9,
2005, at B1.
182. Id.
183. See id.
184. Lucas Oil Stadium, BALLPARKS.COM, http://football.ballparks.com/NFL/Indianapolis
Colts/newindex.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2011).
185. See McNeil, supra note 181.
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favored raising taxes to fund the venue.187 Eventually the stadium was
financed by taxes imposed on entertainment, food, lodging, car rentals, and
ticket sales.188 The Colts and the NFL were to contribute $100 million
dollars to the construction costs of the stadium.189 Because the team was
given a forty-eight million dollar credit for rent paid for use of the RCA
Dome, its actual contribution in dollars toward construction of the dome
was fifty-two million.190 In February 2006, the Indianapolis Colts
announced Lucas Oil had purchased the naming rights for $122 million
over the next twenty years.191 This revenue went into the team¶s treasure
chest because the agreement with Indianapolis stated this revenue was
reserved as property of the team.192
The Indiana Convention Center, including Lucas Oil Stadium
operations, will be the responsibility of a new state agency, the Indiana
Stadium and Convention Building Authority, and the agency shall assume
responsibility and control of the operations. The responsibilities transferred
to the Indiana Stadium and Convention Building Authority will be de-
molishing the RCA Dome, along with the financing, design, and operations
of the entire new facility. The state will become the owner of the entire
facility once it is completed, and the Capital Improvement Board will
assume control.
VI. CONCLUSION
Surprisingly, scant precedent exists regarding government acquisition
of property for privately owned sports stadiums;; the better view is that such
acquisition does not fulfill a public use. There is very little support for a
conclusion that the use will benefit the public. Public finance experts Roger
Noll and Andrew Zimbalist concluded their research by noting no recent
facility appears to have earned anything approaching a reasonable return on
investment and no recent facility has been self-financing in terms of its
impact on net tax revenue.193
The ultimate conclusion to the existing dilemma of ³to build or not to
build´ is that government subsidies cannot be justified in principle. Forcing
some people to pay so others, whomever they are²owners, developers,
187.
188.
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restaurateurs²can profit is a misuse of government money. The only
benefit economists can see is a private benefit, not a public benefit.
Economists conclude that government subsidies in stadium construction is a
form of ³corporation welfare´ and not in the best interests of taxpayers.
Most American taxpayers are uninformed about the legal process of
eminent domain and the probable ramifications. Many people, in particular
young taxpayers, are part of the mania who identify with sports franchises,
sport teams, and individual athletes. This group of young voters, and some
older voters, has a tremendous influence on legislators. Many legislators
have the same personal thoughts as their sport fanatic constituents about the
value that a sports franchise has for establishing a quality of life for their
community. The essence of the overriding thought is, ³We must keep our
professional teams at any cost.´ America¶s governors and mayors, along
with the country¶s judges, appear to be allocating public funds and using
eminent domain power to acquire land for sports stadiums that they then
convey to private profit-making business enterprises. To do this seems
illegal and economically imprudent when public schools, health, and trans-
portation are deprived of adequate resources.194

194. See Philip Weinberg, Eminent Domain for Private Sports Stadiums: Fair or Foul, 35
ENVTL. L. 311, 322 (2005).

